An Historical Perspective of the Arab Spring – One Year On
Tahrir Square on 11 February 2011 by Jonathan Rashad on flickr.com
In 2011 I wrote about the parallels that could be drawn between the extraordinary upheaval in the Middle East and the revolutions that swept across Europe in 1848 – the great ‘Year of Revolutions’, the ‘Spring of Nations’. Since then I have been able to observe, often at first hand, how the parallels have played out in the region.
Now, in the wake of elections in Tunisia and Egypt, during continuing transition in Libya and with uncertainty in places such as Yemen and Syria it is interesting to reflect on how things have developed over the first year of the Arab Spring and see which of my predictions have come to fruition thus far.
The Arab Spring at the end of 2011. Black: Government overthrown. Dark Blue: Sustained civil disorder and governmental changes. Light blue: Protests and governmental changes. Red: Major protests. Yellow: Minor protests. Dark Grey: Protests outside the Arab world (Wikipedia)
Filling the void
One observation I made was that:
Because there was no unified opposition to many of the uprisings in 1848 there were inevitable divisions that weakened the political response, slowed down progress and created a void that needed to be filled.
The main fear now, at least for foreign observers, is that of religious divisions becoming the focus. Even though there has been a noticeable lack of religious rhetoric in the protests across the countries and the presence of extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda have been noticeable in their absence.
The question was: what and who will fill the void when functional political structures had to appear quickly and mostly from situations where there has been no credible political opposition in the past? Because of this in 1848 the old institutions were able to regain a large part of their earlier power.
Cartoon of Field Marshall Tantawi, head of the Egyptian Armed Forces
It is interesting to see that so far it is not the youthful urban liberals – who have led much of the protests – that have become the champions. The victors have been the groups and institutions that have already had a structure and grassroots support in place. For example in Egypt the Army still holds the balance of power; not a great surprise to students of history, but an important fact nonetheless and the cause of on going protests.
Terrorist and extremist groups may not have the upper hand but the real winners in the region have been the Islamists. This was largely to be expected, although few predicted the scale of the victories. In countries where there is no meaningful Civil Society it is the religious institutions that have a values system for people to rally to, an organisational structure to work with, and political reach into every community. Therefore in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt it is the Islamic parties – of various persuasions – that are now in government.
Now the question will be whether these parties are put under pressure to take a harder-line approach to their interpretation of Islam (which is certainly a risk from the Salafist Al-Nour party in Egypt) and whether the more secular parties will become a meaningful opposition who can hold them to account.
Foundations for change
Regarding the broader implications of the uprisings I wrote:
In 1848 many of the revolutions were put down, or the results were seemingly reversed over the next decade, as the old guard took charge in the confusion. Despite this the events of 1848 still had wide ranging and long lasting effects.
Even though many authoritarian regimes remained in power some concessions started to be made. This acted as a pressure release valve and also a platform for subsequent changes…the revolutions also had an influence beyond the countries that they took place in…we can expect that even in other countries in the region that the political elite will be working hard to avoid further upheaval. This is likely to lead to reform, even in seemingly small ways.
It is too early to say whether or not the regime in Syria will remain but other parts of the old guard, most notably the Kingdoms of the Arabian Peninsular, have held on to power. The swift response from Bahrain’s neighbours in putting down the demonstrations there showed how much the monarchies had to lose but even so there are murmurings of reform across the peninsular. The unprecedented actions of the Arab League, who have intervened in Libya and now Syria, are also indicative of the wide-ranging effects of the uprisings. We can expect further reforming measures, albeit small ones, in the coming year.
The next chapter
In my conclusion I said that:
We all made assumptions about the ‘average’ person in the (Middle East), that have been challenged by the nature of the uprisings. It seems that we need to spend some more time really seeking to understand the people in these countries as we develop policy and seek to engage with them.
Now, at the beginning of 2012, the West is distracted by the elections in the US and a crisis in the Eurozone; but we disengage from the Middle East at our peril. Transitions are key moments, where influence can be made for good or ill, so we should be seeking to build new bridges and develop new relationships as a new political landscape emerges across North Africa and the Middle East.
We need to find ways to reach out to the moderates, the liberals and the minorities – the people who have fought for so much but have so far gained so little – if there is going to be stability and prosperity for the good of all in the region.
Tahrir Square in November 2011 - Simon Ash
[...] Last year’s uprisings throughout the Middle East and North Africa have paved the way for Iran to expand its political influence in the region, as Arab governments who were once tough adversaries of the Islamic Republic are being forced to enact policies more reflective of sentiments on the Arab street, which is generally favorable towards Tehran. [...]