After Amman, Whither the Peace Process?
Benjamin Netanyahu, Hillary Clinton, and Mahmoud Abbas during earlier negotiations in Sharm el-Sheikh, September 14, 2010 (Wikicommons)
Those with the capacity to blink will, more likely than not, have missed the most recent round of talks between the Israelis and Palestinians, with a view to getting closer towards a two-state solution, and the conclusion of the seemingly perpetual war. The negotiations between Isaac Molho, envoy for Benjamin Netanyahu, and Saeb Erekat, chief negotiator for the Palestinians, took place in Amman during the month of January, and occurred under the patronage of King Abdullah II of Jordan and at the behest of the Quartet headed by Tony Blair.
The Amman Process ended, as with all negotiations that have occurred under Sharon, Olmert, and Netanyahu, in collapse, rancour, and mutual blame and recrimination for their failure. Now, the Israelis have realised their side of the story, as it were, in order to demonstrate their case that Mahmoud Abbas sought the collapse of these talks. In Ha’aretz, the paper’s most excellent diplomatic correspondent Barak Ravid has published and analysed the Israeli narrative. These are the take-out moments:
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The Palestinian Position
Ravid describes the Palestinian negotiating position regarding statehood as “not surprising”. Erekat outlined their parameters at the first of three meetings which occurred during January. On borders, “the Palestinians called for a return to 1967 borders with an acceptance of land-swaps of 1.9% of the West Bank”. In terms of security, Erekat “agreed to a demilitarized state (devoid of heavy weaponry), and the stationing of an international force on the border between Israel and Jordan, with no presence of Israeli soldiers”.
The Israeli Position
Molho withheld the Israeli parameters until the final meeting, and once they were revealed, Ravid concludes that in essence they were “similar if not identical to that which was presented by Tzipi Livni during the negotiations that took place in 2008 after the Annapolis Conference” (which I have written about here). This includes drawing the border “in a way that will include the maximum amount of Israelis living in the West Bank, and the minimum amount of Palestinians” and annexation of the largest settlement blocs.
When it came to the subject of the stationing of troops in the Jordan Valley, Ravid notes that Molho referred Erekat to “Netanyahu’s speeches to the opening session of the Knesset, as well as to that in front of Congress in May 2011”. In both, the Prime Minister called for “a ‘military presence along the Jordan River’, yet he did not demand that Israel maintain sovereignty over the valley”.
The First Meeting
The Israelis claim that, during the first meeting, the Palestinians “immediately demanded a freeze on settlement building and freeing prisoners” and emphasised that “from their point of view, the talks would end on January 26”, since this was the original deadline outlined by the protocols laid down by the Quartet. Molho was said to have retracted, “We had just begun and you are already threatening to end the talks”. Two further meetings were in fact agreed to.
The Second Meeting
Head of the Strategic Planning Division in the IDF Planning Directorate, Brigadier-General Assaf Orion was invited to the second meeting “in order to summarize Israel’s position on security arrangements”. The Israelis insist that the Palestinians “were not willing to hear the Israeli general”, and delayed the meeting by an hour-and-a-half.
Furthermore, once the meeting had begun, the Israeli negotiating team “presented documents to the Palestinians, including one on incitement against Israel in the Palestinian media. The document contained quotes from the Mufti of Jerusalem that called for the killing of Jews”. Erekat rejected such claims stating, “The accusations are wrong, and in the end you will have to apologize for this slander”.
The Third Meeting and the End of Talks
The final meeting at the end of January ended with Erekat asking for clarification on the 1967 borders, to which Molho replied, “I’d be happy to answer all these questions in the next meeting”. According to Ravid’s report, “A day later, the Palestinians said that they will not resume talks unless Israel freezes settlement building and accepts the principle of 1967 borders”.
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And thus the talks ended. It is unlikely due to the proposed reconciliation with Hamas that discussions between Fatah and the Israeli government will resume, since Israel has also threatened to once again suspend PA tax revenues should such an event occur. It would be tempting to conclude, then, that because of this the peace process has stagnated. That would imply, of course, that it was going somewhere in the first place.
Rather, Ravid’s report makes it damningly clear that since the election of Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel is no closer to peace, and that the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and the years of separation between Gaza and the West Bank has brought the creation of a Palestinain state no nearer. Who is to blame – the obsession of both Israelis and Palestinians – is in this case not particularly important.
